Copy sent H.C.S.G. 11/1.

15 (L)

TOP SECRET 'U'

TICOM/D-60

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS FROM A FILE OF RR Dr. HUETTENHAIN OF OKW/CHI

Attached is the translation of further documents from a recently captured OKW file. From the contents and signatures, the file appears to have been the property of Dr. HUETTENHAIN of OKW/Chi. It is divided into sections, the first of which contains documents on crytographic matters, being mainly memoranda and minutes of high-level inter-service conferences; the second section deals with matters of administration.

Translations of documents from the first part of this file have already been issued as TICOM/D-57 and D-59. The present translation is of documents on the following subjects, arranged chronologically:

1) Participation of Chi in P/W interrogations
2) Three documents on Swedish cypher machines passing through GERMANY to PORTUGAL.
3) Two documents on HUETTENHAIN's posting to Army Group C.
4) Belgian espionage service.
5) Am 10.
6) Breaking of foreign cyphers.
7) Mechanical aids to breaking
8) Three documents on Italian cypher machine
9) Six documents on speech encypherment
10) Two documents on Russian agents' traffic.

The file is registered as TICOM Doc.No.T.1650; it was received in October,1945, from C.I.C. via S.I.D. USFET from an unknown source.

Translator's note: German 'Kompromiss' has in some cases been translated as compromise. It should be understood that this does not mean a physical compromise, but a cryptographic one.

Trans: WRL and KCK

TICOM

6th December, 1945

No. of Pages: 20

Copy No. ~~52~~ 19

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33. Mr. Borsall for E.E.I.S.

Chef "Chi" Berlin 1 Nov 1944.

Subject: Participation of Chi in P/W Interrogations and in Captured Material

Memorandum

Chef WNV

1) P/W Interrogations

It has repeatedly occurred that Chi did not participate in the interrogation of Ps/W who could make statements concerning enemy codes and cyphers or the security of German codes and cyphers. Chi only became aware of these statements by chance and usually so late that it was not possible to utilize them. Since these statements provide, at times, the only possibility of obtaining information concerning enemy codes and cyphers or the security of our own codes and cypher, it is absolutely imperative that Chi participates at the interrogations.

If the interrogation shows that the P/W is able to make a statement concerning enemy or our own codes and cyphers Ag WNV/Chi must be informed in order that, if necessary, another interrogation may be undertaken by Chi. Chef WNV must see that all interrogating stations let Chi department participate.

2) Captured Material

Chef WNV is likewise to see to it that the various branches of the Armed Forces are bound to inform Chi of all captured code and cypher machines, instructions, data etc. and when requested to place the necessary material at the disposal of Chi for evaluation.

Trans: WRL

IV C Berlin 24 January 1944

Subject: Transport of Swedish Cypher Machines through GERMANY to PORTUGAL

Memorandum

Chef Chi

The Head of the Transport Service of Lufthansa, Herr Von ALVENSLEBEN (Tel.No.19 53 53) reported by telephone this morning that the 24 large and 30 small Swedish Hagelin machines which were transported through GERMANY by air have been delivered to the typewriter, calculating and adding machine firm of M SIMOES Jr, Conçeição 41, LISBON. The air bills of lading were made out to the Portuguese Ministry of War as consignee.

Herr Von ALVENSLEBEN will endeavour to discover if the machines are sent on further by this firm.

(Signed) Dr. Hüttenhain

Trans: WRL

Berlin. 12 January 1944
Tel.No. 67 270

Subject: Transport of Swedish Cypher Machines Through GERMANY to PORTUGAL

Memorandum

Chef Chi via L IV

On the morning of 11 January at the Tempelhof airfield RR Dr. HÜTTENHAIN, Reg.Baurat ROTSCHEIDT and Lt.Dr. STEIN inspected Swedish Cypher machines to be transported by air from SWEDEN to PORTUGAL.

The Head of the Transport Service of Lufthansa, Herr Von ALVENSLEBEN (Tel.No. 19 53 53) was present during the inspection.

There were 24 large, i.e. electrically driven, and 30 small i.e. manually operated, Swedish Hagelin machines. The consignment is addressed to the Portuguese Minister of War. Since the letter W cannot be encyphered on the machine it is certain that the machines are not destined for ENGLAND or AMERICA.

On the afternoon of 11 January Herr Von ALVENSLEBEN was informed that as far as Chi was concerned there was nothing against the onward transport of these machines.

(Signed) Dr. Hüttenhain

(Trans: WRL)

L IV 10 January 1944

Chef Chi

Memorandum on Swedish Cypher Machines

The U.S.A. have ordered Cypher Machines (Kryptoteknik Hagelin) in STOCKHOLM which, according to Abwehr, Air, are to be transported by air to SPAIN. Apparatus of such a consignment can be seen on 11.1.44 at the office of the Head of the Transport Department of Lufthansa, Von ALVENSLEBEN.

An inspection will take place at 0930 hours by RR Dr. HÜTTENHAIN, .Reg.Baurat Dipl, Ing ROTSCHEIDT, Lt.Dr. STEIN (in civilian clothes at ALVENSLEBEN's request, since a Swedish Control Official is close by)

Chi IV is of the opinion that at least one apparatus must be secured because the apparatuses have recently been considerably improved and up to now a break-in into the cypher has not succeeded. Abwehr Air will not, however, hear of this, in order not to prejudice good relations with certain circles in the Iberian Peninsula.

RR Dr. HÜTTENHAIN has been instructed to persuade ALVENSLEBEN to delay the onward transport so that the Admiral and Generalleutnant can participate.

(TRANS: WRL)

Dr. HÜTTENHAIN

Employee in OKW

Berlin, 7 Nov. 1939

L IV

Report on the Attachment to Army Group C
Evaluation Section

On 2 September 1939 the French Army Code F 110 was replaced by a new code so that traffic could no longer be broken currently.

On 3 September 1939 I was seconded to FRANKFURT-ON-MAIN in order to take part in the task of breaking this new code. The task was accomplished at the beginning of October so that all the September material could be read retrospectively.

This success was made possible in such a short time by the fact that

1) the necessary data (Code etc) was obtained by months of work in peace time, chiefly by Herrn TRAPPE (Chi OKW) and SCHMIDT (Chi OKW)

2) a close co-operation between the above named gentlemen and me could be established.

It was therefore, still possible in October to work on the October material with success. In addition to the above named gentlemen Herr Professor Dr. FÖPPL was of great assistance in the solution of this system.

As the system was not changed on 1 November 1939 this code could be read currently again from the date when the October key was broken. On 3 November 1939 at the finish of my attachment in FRANKFURT-ON-MAIN I was sent to BERLIN.

(Trans: WRL)

Dr. HÜTTENHAIN

Employee in OKW

Berlin, 7 Nov 1939

Memorandum

L IV

When I was saying goodbye to the military head of the evaluation section of Army Group C at the termination of my attachment in FRANKFURT-ON-MAIN, the head of the evaluation section expressed his regret to me that he could not yet present me with some sign of outward recognition for work successfully carried out in FRANKFURT-ON-MAIN. To that I replied that success attained was not due to the effort of an individual but was the result of development and common effort and that if outward recognition should reward this work, Herrn TRAPPE (Chi OKW), SCHMIDT (Chi OKW) and Professor Dr. FÖPPL (Chi OKW) should be likewise remembered. The head of the project thereupon told me that these gentlemen would be similarly distinguished.

In the course of the conversation I said, that for us the finest recognition was the knowledge that important intelligence, which could serve as a basis for the further conduct of the war, had been sent to G.H.Q. The head of the project replied that he quite understood this attitude but he would like to make military departments appreciate our work at the full value for up to now, they have shown little understanding of the difficulties of such work.

At the same time, the head of the project requested me to convey his thanks to the Chiffrier Section OKW for the assistance given to the military decyphering section and remarked that in his opinion such a large decyphering task could not be done be OKH either now or in the near future.

Trans: WRL

Chi IV C Berlin, 9 September 1943

Subject: Decoding attempt in the Belgian Espionage Service

1) The identifications already carried out there of isolated single letters and pairs of letters interspersed in the plain text appear to be correct. The identification of further letters is not possible at this end because of the small volume of material.
2) We did not succeed in breaking the cipher texts consisting of 5/L groups as there was not enough material. But it may be possible to break it given more material.

Suggestion: All material of the Belgian espionage service that comes in should be passed on to Chi.

Dr. HÜTTENHAIN

Trans: HD

IV C Berlin, 27 July 1943

Three weeks ago a discussion was held in the Foreign Office between

ORR Dr KUNZE (Foreign Office)
RR VOEGELE (Air) in the presence of
RR Dr WEISZER (Chi).

RR VOEGELE declared his willingness to cooperate on the Am 10 and ORR Dr KUNZE undertook to provide the necessary material.

RR VOEGELE was held off for a fortnight. When he pressed for the production of the promised material, ORR Dr KUNZE stated that he had changed his mind and would not provide the material, as Dr VOEGELE had made disparaging remarks about his work.

Chi is very keen on the "zero" traffic [Nullverkehr] of the Am 10 being broken. This "zero" traffic, by an agreement between Chi and the Foreign Office, was left to the Foreign Office to deal with. Chi is dealing with the special traffics of the Am 10; results as they come in are sent to the Foreign Office.

Suggestion: L IV or Chef Chi should arrange with ORR PASCHKE for the already planned collaboration of the Foreign Office with Air actually to come into force. Should the Foreign Office not consent, Chi will terminate the agreement with the Foreign Office to get a free hand, so that Chi can collaborate with Air.
A direct approach to ORR Dr KUNZE does not seem advisable.

Dr HÜTTENHAIN

(Trans: HD)

IV C 1 Berlin, 10 November 1941

Copy 2

TOP SECRET

Attitude to Memorandum C2 of 7.11.41. Defined below is the attitude taken to the above mentioned memorandum from a cryptographical view point.

Unauthorized decyphering has been made considerably more difficult in recent years by two facts:-

1) The hand systems brought into use by foreign countries are so well and expediently recoded that work on these cypher texts can only be carried out with success if a large staff of well trained workers is employed.
2) Foreign countries are increasingly going over to the use of machines for the encypherment of signals. Unauthorized decypherment without a knowledge of the machine is only possible in the case of primitive machines. With a knowledge of the machine the work of decyphering can only be carried out successfully with a great sacrifice of time and man power.
Both these facts will make the future work of decypherment more and more difficult if fundamentally new methods are not employed.
In order to give an idea of the difficulties which are already arising it may be mentioned that work has been carried out in the Foreign Office for two years with a staff of 25 people on an American diplomatic cypher but up to now it has not been possible to break even one message of the material, which is constantly coming in.

In my section attempts are being made just now to solve the French Cypher Machine B 211. Because the statistical work is too voluminous an apparatus has been developed by C2 by means of which these statistics are dealt with mechanically. Accurate tests showed that the apparatus accomplished what 10 people would do in the same time. And this is quite apart from the fact that the machine still works just as reliably after any length of time as at the beginning. Experience has shown that statistics of this kind done by hand are no longer reliable after approximately 1 hour.
The diplomatic cypher referred to in the memorandum is a Japanese traffic. Without the employment of mechanical aids the solution, the principle of which is known, will, from experience, make such lagging progress by this means that, either 20 new assistants will have to be engaged on this work or else a worthwhile evaluation of the contents will be jeopardized .
Since the Phasensuchgerät [Trans note: apparatus for determination of periods] developed by C2 carries out statistical work of the kind required, it is planned to use it after it has been converted.
In my opinion there is fundamentally only one way to make possible the solution of certain cyphers in the future - work on the traffic must be carried out mechanically.

(Trans: WRL)

20.11.43.

Survey of mechanical aids to decipherment

To produce the punched tapes the following instruments are used:

1) Hand perforator for 5-hole tape (110 and 220 volts AC/DC); trade model; 2 at the most needed. (About 400 RM). Normal typing speed.

2) One perforator transmitter, trade model;(about 400 RM) (110 and 220 AC/DC).

3) One perforator receiver, trade model; (about 400 RM). (110 and 222 AC/DC).

4) One teleprinter, trade model (about 800 RM)to convert into letter or figure text and to check the perforated strips.

5) Perforator testing instrument, special model (about 800 RM); while perforating the 2nd strip it checks the 1st strip which has already been printed, and vice versa. (200 volts AC). Only required in special cases.

6) Perforated tape counter (for hand operation).

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group/Class ..... HW 40

Piece 174

TICOM/D-60 : Pages 8 and 9 redacted under S3(4) of the PRA 1958

(date) 28/1/2004

(Signed) .....

Berlin, 3 May 1943.

Dear Hartenberg,

I thank you for your report on your visit to Fregattenkapitän COMEL. As you know we are greatly interested in the development of the cyphers of our Italian ally. Regierungsrat Dr HÜTTENHAIN, who had the opportunity in January of seeing the machines with you, is again concerned with the problem of the security of the machine. I request you to convey our thanks, in the form which seems most suitable to you, to the gentlemen of the Italian Navy who have supplied information in such an obliging manner.

The mechanical part of the cypher teleprinter appears to us to be solved extremely successfully, just now we have nothing equal to it. The economy of material and space impressed us especially. In addition it seems very good to us, that teleprinters already available can so easily be converted into cypher teleprinters by the building in of the cypher attachment.

During the inquiries carried out here only a few suggestions for improvement were made, calculated to increase still more the security of the machine. We would suggest that you inform the competent gentlemen of this in the form which seems suitable to you.

We see a danger in the uneven number of active pins in each of the 7 discs. In addition the distribution of the pins on the periphery of the discs is a consideration. An unfavourable choice of the number and distribution of pins could cause considerable shortening of periods so that unauthorized de-coding would be assisted.

It seems, furthermore, advisable to change the Message Setting Book occasionally, even if at fairly long intervals of time.

It will be known that messages in depth must be avoided under all circumstances; otherwise all key settings can be recovered.

In the event of further liaison being desired at your end I request you to prepare this and advise me of it.

(Trans: WRL)

Berlin, 15 April 1943

Dear Hartenberg,

The inquiries into the security of the new Italian cypher teleprinter have been concluded for the time being. The model of the cypher teleprinter which was demonstrated in ROME on 28th January 1943 was examined in connection with the planned operating instructions given verbally. The cypher text thus obtained does not satisfy the security conditions required by OKW/Chi of their own cypher texts.

It was established in the course of the enquiry that by means of other operating instructions the security of the Italian cypher teleprinter could be so increased that, at least, single cypher texts could not be broken.

Before an official opinion can be submitted to the Italian Navy it must be established:

1) whether alterations have been made to the machine since the demonstration in January of this year.
2) according to what cypher and operating instructions (pin arrangement of the 7 wheels, change of keys of all kinds, choice of message setting, etc) it is to be operated.

Please ascertain the way in which the Italian cypher teleprinter is to be employed - best of all by producing a description of the machine and cypher instructions.

Please treat this matter in every way as confidential.

(Signed) K+ 14/4

+Trans note: Signature written in full elsewhere, apparently KEMPF.

Trans: WRL

Chef IV C Berlin, 10 February 1943

Report on the new Italian Cypher Teleprinter.

On 28 January 1943 the Italian Navy demonstrated the new Cypher teleprinter to German authorities in ROME (Main Wireless Station, ROME and OKW/Chi).

This new cypher teleprinter works on the international 5 element alphabet system, the 5 impulses of which are encyphered by an additive key [Umblendung]. 7 changeable pin wheels are used for this. 2 wheels act as the drive, the remaining 5 wheels perform the addition [Umblendung] of the 5 impulses to each character. The drive is effected as follows: a driving wheel is stepped evenly, whilst the other wheels are unevenly stepped by means of one working on the other.

A superficial examination shewed that the cypher teleprinter does not satisfy present security requirements. One message of 6000 elements or several messages totalling 10,000 elements are enough to effect a solution of the machine.

The possibility exists that other breaking methods would be successful with less material. This task is being carried out at Chi IV C.

The Italian Navy has not been informed of the low security of its apparatus. The Italian Navy was not told that a decoding specialist was presemt at the demonstration.

(Trans:WRL)

Chef Chi Berlin, 12 Sept 1944

Memorandum

Subject: Speech Encypherment Sets.

Chef AG WNV

There is in GERMANY today no speech encypherment set secure against decypherment. All available sets can only be considered as making decypherment more difficult. There are however proposals for the development of a secure speech encypherment set. It was established by Chi in co-operation with Wa Prüf 7 that a set can be built which is unbreakable in the present state of technical knowledge. This machine is based on the principle of artificial speech with multiple wobbulation controlled by means of a cypher attachment known to be unbreakable. The principle of artificial speech presents, at the moment, the only possible basis for a secure speech encypherment set.

Such a machine is being developed at Ebermannstadt (Feuerstein Laboratory, Prof. Dr. Vierling). In June a demonstration was carried out there before the Authorised Representative for Technical Signals Equipment [GBN] and Chi. Measures for the further development and production were discussed, in particular the necessity of allotting personnel to Professor Dr. Vierling was agreed upon. Nothing however has been done yet. GBN complains about the delays caused by Director LÜSCHEN and Professor KÜPFMÜSSER in the discussions.

If any value at all is placed on having a secure speech encypherment machine which can be used in the near future it is necessary that the developments started at Ebermannstadt be energetically pursued.

The suggestion, made at various conferences, that the Feuerstein Laboratory should be exclusively employed in the construction of decypherment machines for speech is considered to be inexpedient and impracticable since experience in the construction of such machines can only be acquired by the development and construction of ones own Speech Encypherment Machines.

((Signed)) KETTLER

Trans: WRL

Chi IV C

Berlin, 29 February 1944

Subject: Essay by Dr. W. POLACZEK, SALZBURG "Secrecy of Wireless Communication"

Memorandum

Chef Ag WNV

The essay is chiefly concerned with possibilities of speech encypherment. The systems quoted are all known, usually from open or released patent specifications. Publication in the form of this essay would, in the usual sense, doubtless mean an advance in technical knowledge in that further circles would take an interest in the problems dealt with.

As, however, the systems, quoted are to some extent the basis of the Speech Camouflaging apparatuses (e.g. Richard apparatus of the Air Force) used by the Armed Forces, publication would not seem to be desirable particularly since the essay judges the security of the systems and reveals the weaknesses and possibilities of breaking in.

(Signed) ROTSCHEIDT 29/2

Trans: WRL

IV C 4

Berlin, 15 February 1944

Subject: Procuring of a Philips-Miller Sound Recording Apparatus (Indent 170/349 IV C 4 of 7.1.44)

To

Z via L IV

The above mentioned apparatus represents the only measuring apparatus for the study and breaking of encyphered speech traffic and of telegraphy already encyphered in transmission and also for examining our own enciphered speech traffic. With its help the necessary examinations of frequencies can be carried out in a comparatively short time.

The price of the complete apparatus, according to Messrs Philips' estimate, is 72,000 RM with delivery in roughly two years time.

It is requested that the necessary funds be made available.

(Signed) ROTSCHEIDT 15/2

Trans: WRL

Chi IV C Berlin, 30 October 1943

Subject: Development of Speech Encypherment Machines at the Brown-Boveri Company in SWITZERLAND

Memorandum

Chef Chi

To date there is still no secure speech encypherment machine.

Of the developments of secret speech apparatus undertaken in GERMANY by authorities and business firms, some have been suspended and some amalgamated since February 1943 by Chef Ag WNV. Only two main types of machine are to be built.

1) A machine to make unauthorized listening-in by operating personnel more difficult.
2) A machine completely secure against decypherment.

Both of these developments are being worked on and it is thought they will lead to a positive result.

Abroad, the firm of Brown-Boveri and Co, BADEN, SWITZERLAND has been engaged for some years on the development of Speech Encypherment Machines. In June 1942 Wa Prüf 7 (Oberst HENGIST and Dr. LIEBKNECHT) and OKW/Chi (Regierungsrat Dr. HÜTTENHAIN) were able to acquaint themselves with the work at Brown-Boveri and Co on the spot. Wa Prüf 7 ordered two machines, which, however, it has not been possible to deliver to date owing to export difficulties. It is said that these difficulties have now been overcome. At the beginning of October 1943 Brown-Boveri requested that specialist personnel should be sent to BADEN in SWITZERLAND to renew discussions on the state of development.

Chef WNV has always taken an interest in these developments. It appears therefore, highly desirable to be able to follow up the course of foreign developments in secret speech apparatus.

It is, therefore, requested that Ministerialrat FENNER and Reg.Rat Dr. HÜTTENHAIN be sent to Messrs. Brown-Boveri and Co. at BADEN, SWITZERLAND in order to report on the machines developed there from the point of view of security.

Trans: WRL

Chi IV C 1 Berlin, 20 November 1942

Memorandum

Chef Chi

On the occasion of the transfer of a Secret Speech Apparatus from Wa F to Wa Prüf 7 at the firm of Te-Ka-De in KAULSDORF on 18 November 1942, Chi had its first opportunity of seeing it demonstrated. A superficial examination of the security of this apparatus showed that it does not satisfy present day requirements. If the apparatus, which is still being developed, is finally constructed in the form proposed its introduction will have to be turned down for security reasons. Valuable time in its development could have been saved if the advice of the cryptanalysts had been asked at an early stage.

(Signed) Dr. HÜTTENHAIN

(Trans: WRL)

Chi 19 March 1942

Memorandum

Messrs. Brown-Boveri and Co. BADEN,SWITZERLAND make secret speech apparatus which can be employed in line and wireless traffic.

It is recognised, from the firm's publications concerning these machines, that they are good and crypto-technically equal to German developments. In many respects they surpass the German machines in construction. The machines by Brown-Boveri and Co. are, for instance, contained in four portable boxes whilst the German machines can only be used installed on static sites owing to their great weight.

According to the firm, mobile trials carried out in the open produced satisfactory results.

It may be assumed that the firm has progressed in the planning and construction of machines of this type further then they state in their publications.

The firm hopes to do business with German authorities.

The Armament Office [Waffenamt] wishes to send an engineer to BADEN, SWITZERLAND, who will give an expert opinion from a technical standpoint, formed on the spot, on the secret speech apparatus described in the publications, and will find out the actual state of technical development.

Question: Is it possible for Dr. HÜTTENHAIN and Regierungsoberinspektor MENZER also to travel to BADEN, SWITZERLAND, in order to learn the state of development from the standpoint of the security of the machines.

Trans: WRL

IV C 1 BERLIN 3 May 1943.

Subject: Russian Agents' Transmitters in SWITZERLAND ("Red Three")

Enclosure: 16 decoded messages.

Memorandum

Chef Chi

On 23 February 1943 Chi was requested by WNV/Fu to work on the messages of the Russian agents' transmitters in SWITZERLAND since no results were yet available from In 7 VI. The traffic appeared to be very important, however; it had been intercepted since September 1941.

At the end of March Chi was in possession of all the traffic so that a start could be made on it.

It only took a few days to find out the encoding principle used. On 22 April 16 messages on one indicator group were broken.

It must be observed that this break-in into the cipher took place without any further data so that it could have been effected in 1941.

Work was carried out in liaison with In 7 VI. Fundamental findings were thereby communicated to In 7 VI which enabled In 7 VI to make a break-in at roughly the same time.

After the break-in had been made it was agreed that In 7 VI would continue to work on this system while Chi had started working on another system (indicator group 24680 in the second position).

1) from inn to (vyz)
16.10.41 0330
msg ck 26
So far no news from Za...ung near Benjaminus a No.258 Dora

2) from iep to ?
20.10.41 0325
msg ck 259
Continuation of No.274 . 6(?) At end September German army consisted of ,00 divisions of all types. To that must be added 1,500,000 men of Organisation Todt and one million men of the various air force regional organisations inclusive .....men and the reparations .....but without Signals and Flak.....

3) from iep to (vyz)
21.10.41
msg ck 316
After receiving good information via the banker Nussbaumer, I contacted him by means of an agent. He is prepared to be of service to us but cannot carry out the desired operations since he is official controller of foreign currency between SWITZERLAND and U.S.A. He suggests .....

4) from iep to (vyz)
21.10.41 0343
msg ck 18
Paul requests 3000 dollars No.271 Dora.

5) from iep to (vyz)
21.10.41 0333
msg ck 27
Lisey can go for a few days to MARSEILLE and NICE.
No.270

6) from iep to (vyz)
21.10.41 0408
msg ck 64
German Government protests to Swiss Government owing to the publication of a war secret in the newspapers here, that Swiss medical column is going to the eastern front. No. 268 Dora.

7) from iep to (vyz)
21.10.41 0351
msg ck 64
From Salfer. Germans concentrating troops between MUNICH and BRENNER owing to possibility of collapse in ITALY. Italians continuing fortification of northern frontier. No.267 Dora.

8) from iia to (vyz)
22.10.41 0325
msg ck 196
Via Long. From Erst Lemmer. Member of the RIBBENTROP office who telephoned from BERLIN to the editor of the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung". In the future I shall call him "Agnes" 1.... of the propaganda companies in BRIANSK in the expectation of the entry into MOSCOW, which was planned for 14 then for 20 October. 2. On 17 October orders for .....

9) from iia to (vyz)
22.10.41. 0408
msg ck 248
Via Long from Luise out of OKW. As a result of losses sustained most German divisions on the eastern front have lost homogeneity. In addition to completely trained personnel they consist of personnel with 4 to 6 months training and of personnel with only one sixth of the necessary training period. 2) Leading generals in OKW.....

10) from ish to (vyz)
29.12.41
msg ck 111
From German industrialists arrived here. For the last few days in all Germany.....amongst others of lifting machines, dredges assembled and then eastern front.....underground airfields east.....(message very corrupt).

11) from iep to (vyz)
9.12.41. 0517
msg ck 267
Ex BERLIN from LUISE. New attack on MOSCOW is not result of a strategical decision but conforms to the bad feeling throughout the German Army owing to the fact that since 22 June new targets which are repeatedly being set have not been reached. As a result of Soviet resistance Plan 1 Urals, Plan 2 Archangel, Astrachan, Plan 3 Caucasus have had to be given .....

12) from iia to (vyz)
10.12.41 0451
msg ck 267
Via Long from Directorate of the Swiss Airways Company who has just returned from MUNICH where he had discussions with German Lufthansa.
1) Strength of German Air Force at presnet 22 thousand first and second line aircraft. To that must be added 6,000 to 6,500 Junkers 52 Transport aircraft.
2) At the present time there are in GERMANY each day .....

13) from inn to (vyz)
16.10.41 0208
msg ck 312
From Swiss chemical warfare experts. The following are new German poison compounds.
1) Formylchloridoxop. Formula CLHC colon NOH. Formylchloridoxim. Formula CLHC colon NOH 2.
2) Cyanformylchloridoxim. Formula CLCNCD colon NOH....

14) from fzp to (nda)
24.12.41 0302
msg ck 452
Senior officers of the German occupation forces in the Colonial Ministry in PARIS estimate the length of the war to be another two years and then expect the defeat of GERMANY. No. 272 Dora. Via Salfer.....government order prominent German staying here who was previously in close touch with the Nazis. The German people.....war weary and resigned.....

15) from iep to (vyz)
9.12.41 0436
msg ck 66
Meeting with Paul. At half past eleven Sunday morning at UETLIBERG station near ZURICH. Paul holding French magazine "L'illustré". Your man carrying the Berne newspaper "Dor Bund". No. 288 Dora.

16) from iep to (vyz)
25.11.41 0005
msg ok 37
If we transmit the sign qxx. qxx, we are then changing our transmitting wavelength to 33 metres.No. 290 Dora.

Trans: WFL

L IV

20 October 1943

Chef Chi

Memorandum

Subject: Item 4 in the Minutes of the Conference WNV/Fu/Chi on 8.10.1943.

It is surprising that WNV/Fu attaches value to the work on the Agents' Code 24680 being treated as a priority matter. For In 7 VI has just not provided that which was asked for, namely:

a) assistance in changing the letters into figures
b) an increase of the material
c) an improvement of the material.

Oberleutnant VAUK has been acquainted with this by me by telephone. I clearly explained to him that it is pointless to work on it under these circumstances. Oberleutnant VAUK promised Professor NOVOPASCHENNY to do something with regard to b) and c) (17.7.43). If he did not have any success at this, he therefore best of all must realize that the conditions for breaking Code 24680 were not fulfilled. In these circumstances it is, objectively at least, unjustifiable to attach value to priority work on it.

Up to 17.7.43 Chi IV only had roughly 100 imperfect telegrams. After the conversation with Oberleutnant VAUK the following unexpected phenomenon came to light:

Messages delivered from In 7:

July 1943:	23rd, 29th	2 messages	
Aug. "	7th, 12th, 17th	3 "	(delivered at end of Sept!)
Sept. "	3rd, 5th, 8th, 10th,	8 "	" 8th October)

A total of 13 messages since the request for an improvement of the material. Still just single messages. A comparison of the achievement of Professor NOVOPASCHENNY with that of In 7 VI is, therefore, likewise irrelevant and is calculated to produce a false picture of the actual conditions to uninitiated participants at the conference.

It is, therefore, not worth going into further details, since neither is agreement to be reached nor close working together to be attained on a foundation of an inaccurate statement of facts.

Proposal: To return the 24680 material to In 7 VI with this explanation:

> "Material 24680 is returned herewith. Work on it has been stopped because the expert's request for an improvement of the material in quantity and quality has not been fulfilled.
> In the event of further explanation being necessary it rests with you to get into direct contact with Professor NOVOPASCHENNY".

(Signed)FENNER (?)

Trans: WRL.